TRANSPOWER

SAFETY ALERT!

Half Way Bush (HWB) Assurance Incident

WHAT HAPPENED?

- While working at HWB substation, an [redacted] technician observed a [redacted] switcher (contractor to the local lines company [redacted]) preparing to remove earths from a 33kV feeder in the [redacted] controlled area at the HWB switchyard.
- The earths were part of an assurance from [redacted] for an outage on the Transpower side of the 33kV switchyard. The Delta switcher had been instructed to remove the earths by the [redacted] control room.

ROOT CAUSE

- The [redacted] control room SCADA system and processes did not capture all the necessary information around assurances issued to other parties. The log/job pack that the control room uses did not show the assurance issued to the technician working on the Transpower network.

WHAT IS IN PLACE TO PREVENT A REOCCURRENCE OF THIS INCIDENT?

After discussions with [redacted]/Transpower, [redacted] recognised the deficiencies in their system and have initiated the following actions:

- Informed their control room operators that they would have appropriate support if they needed to stop the proceedings due to any issue;
- Hired an expert to configure and maintain the electronic system to incorporate the required permit and assurance information;
- Provided further training to all the control room operators; and,
- Developed a written process to enable all the operators to handle the control room assurance and permit requests consistently.

COULD THIS HAVE BEEN YOU?

WHAT ARE YOU GOING TO DO DIFFERENTLY?

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