
SHE BRIEF
CO2 Release

Alert — Brief — Close out

A — B — C → HOME SAFE



Key initial learnings to be shared more widely

An investigation has found that a specialist contract partner employed in the removal of the fire suppressant system was not familiar with this specific arrangement. The system was isolated correctly before the initial entry to the substation.

The CP entered the substation unsupervised to ascertain how they were going to complete the task. In doing so they removed the weight from one of the gas bottles causing the tension to be released on the safety bond, resulting in the discharge of 4 bottles into the substation.

While there were no injuries as a result of the incident, it is important to remember, **NEVER** interfere with equipment you are unfamiliar with.

Recently, we issued the briefing on Fire Suppression Systems on the good practices which should be followed when identifying and isolating CO2 systems which are contained on some of our sites.

This requirement is clearly stated in:
• PR-NET-OSM-006 DISTRIBUTION OPERATIONAL SAFETY RULES 2022

If it is not safe, we don't do it!








SHE ALERT
CO2 Release

Alert A → Brief B → Close out C → HOME SAFE



Date of incident	9th February 2026		Directorate	Services	
Region	SEPD Customer ops North	Location	Maidenhead	Classification	HiPo
What happened ?					

During the removal of a CO2 system in a secondary substation, by a specialist contract partner, the system was inadvertently activated with one person within the substation. Fortunately, the individual was able to evacuate the substation with no injuries.

Recently we issued a brief on the good practices which should be followed when identifying and isolating CO2 systems which are contained on some of our sites.

While we investigate this incident, please refresh yourselves with this brief. If you encounter a system and you are not sure on how to isolate safely, do not enter the substation, please use your license and stop, if it's not safe, we don't do it and seek advice.

